and corporation is becoming more common. The likelihood of licensing has increased since the passage of PL 96-517 in 1980, but only in academic institutions that have established formal in-house patent and license offices. The paper also discusses several genera1 issues relating to the role of academic patent and license offices in effective technology transfer.
Introduction
Academic and quasi-academic institutions have long been important initial sources of commercial goods [l&20] .
Many medical devices, pharmaceutical compounds, indust~al instruments, computer programs, and pollution control devices, for instance, have first emerged as well-developed designs or, more frequently, as partially formulated research ideas, in university and medical school laboratories in North America, Europe and Japan. 28] . AIDS vaccines and new sources may emerge in the future, drawing on current academic research. But although academic research remains an important source of commercial goods, the methods by which academic advances are transferred to commercial producers are changing.
Traditionally, most ideas and designs have been transferred to corporate producers informally, via hands off methods such as academic publications or through individual contact methods such as hiring students or consulting with researchers [3, 7, 8, 15, 16, 27] . As recently as the late 1970s as Niels Reimers noted, "many universities
[had] no . . . mechanism for licensing of research results" [19] . Even universities with licensing mechanisms often did not operate an on-campus patent and licensing office, choosing instead to contract with external patent and license agents, which give high ratings only to the most promising ideas [4] and so might file for only a few patents each year at any one academic institution.
In the past decade, however, universities throughout the world have attemped to capture part of the revenue generated by academic research [3, 5, 28] .
In The paper proceeds in 6 parts. In part 2, I discuss diagnostic imaging equipment and identify the sources used to collect information about transfer of imaging device knowledge from academic institutions to corporate manufacturers. In parts 3 and 4, I identify transfer methods used and changes in the relative incidence of the methods since the 1950s and then discuss changes in licensing incidence. In part 5, I extend the discussion to the broader of transfer incidence, revenue generation, and effective transfer. Finally, in part 6, I conclude the paper with a brief summary. license office for this study, though, were that the academic institution had an on-campus system for receiving and evaluating disclosures of potentially patentable work from its researchers, and was prepared to file for patents and attempt to license products and process that it thought had commercial potential.
Diagnostic imaging equipment and study data
License terms varied widely regarding exclusivity of product and geographic use, pre-commercialization licensing fees and post-commercialization royalty terms, responsibility to obtain patents, responsibility to pursue patent infringement cases, sublicensing rights, rights to follow-up research, application of the agreement to subsequent products, and reversion clauses. In addition, distribution of license revenue across university, department, and researcher varied widely. For this study, the common denominator was that the academic institution or its agent had negotiated an agreement with the manufacturer specifying the terms by which rights to the product would be trans- The relative frequency of transfer method has been changing, with changes in the first generation methods being of particular interest in this study. Table 3 reports product-moment correlations of the transfer methods with the year of transfer. The hands off and individual contact methods are declining in relative incidence, while the organizational contact methods of arms length licenses and sponsored projects are increasing. There is no significant change in the relative incidence of researcher startups. The decline in hiring researchers must be interpreted carefully, however, because many of the cases of organizational contact also involve contact with individual researchers. 
Diagnostic imaging equipment academic licensing incidence
As reported in Table 2 , whether the transfer took place during the first or second generation of commercialization, licenses were negotiated in only a minority of cases. Of the 128 first generation cases for which I was able to obtain licensing information, only 53 were licensed from the institution. With second generation transfer, licenses with the originating academic institution were even more uncommon; only 11 of 55 recorded cases of second generation transfer an academic license. However, incidence varied among the different categories. Within the first generation, commercial products that emerged from academic research projects at least partly sponsored by a manufacturer tended to involve formal licenses specifying post-commercialization payment to the institution; a significant minority, however, did not. Licenses were relatively unusual in cases of transfer via researcher employment. In the cases of researcher's students being hired, which 1 omitted from the report owing to incomplete data, licenses also were unusual. And startup firms established by researchers or their students usually did not license the technology from the research institution.
Within the second generation categories, only in sublicensing cases was it common to find the academic institution included in the negotiated terms, but even in this class only half the cases resulted in an academic license, always in cases where the first generation transfer took place via a license specifying that sublicenses must include participation by the university. Few academic licenses were negotiated when one company acquired another. Similarly, when employees of a firm left it to start a new company, licenses were not negotiated back to the originating academic institution.
And in the cases of the omitted second generation class that I did identify, where one firm copied another manufacturer's design or incorporated elements of the design into its own product, academic licenses were not obtained.
Although licensing is low, it has changed over time. Moreover, the incidence has varied depending on whether the originating research institution has a formal patent and license office. Table 4 reports the results of logistic regression analysis used to investigate factors associated with license incidence.
Overall, the specified logistic regression equation provided reasonable explanation of licensing incidence, as shown by the 74 percent fit of predicted to actual cases. I found an increasing trend in licensing incidence during the 1954-1988 period of the study; the later the transfer took place, the more likely a license was negotiated.
To and raises important issues for further study.
Has the incidence of technology transfer increused?
Although products that are transferred now are more likely to be licensed, another important issue is whether products are more likely to be transferred. If technology transfer offices simply capture part of the rent stream of products that would have been commercialized anyway, diverting it into pockets of the institutions and the researchers, they are doing part of their job. But it may be the smallest part. Indeed, in a closed economy with a well-functioning tax system and the political will to fund academic research, the rent capture part of the academic technology transfer job would not be necessary. A closed economy, or at least a balance in international technology acquisition, would ensure that the jobs and income resulting from commercialization of academic research accrue to the same economic entity that funded the research. A well-functioning tax system would ensure that the income resulting from the commercialization would return to the political system. And the political will to fun academic research would ensure that the income is recycled into the institutions.
(A nirvana in which all three conditions are met, however, seems unlikely.) Of greater import is whether technology patent and license offices increase the likelihood that useful ideas and goods become used.
The folk-lore of academic research contains many stories of potentially useful products that have not been developed. A product may languish in the lab for many reasons [12] . Once the first joy of experimentation has worn off, the researcher may not be interested in the tedious refinement that is necessary for a commercial product.
Academics may fail to recognize the commercial potential. Necessary complementary products may not be available. No company may be willing to invest the funds necessary for refinement. Or a match between the product and a suitable company may never be found.
On-site technology patent and license offices cannot solve all these problems. But they do have the potential to solve some of them. They an increase information flow out of the institution, so that potential commercializers are more likely to learn of the product. By ensuring that patent rights are obtained, they can increase the likelihood that some company will invest in further refinement.
By acting as a liaison between the researcher and the manufacturer, they can increase the likelihood that a researcher will spend time working on refining the product.
These potential advantages should not be exaggerated. Established manufacturers usually know which researchers are doing research related to equrpment research their products. They often follow their projects closely, sometimes partly funding them, sometimes hiring the researcher on consulting contracts, sometimes hiring his or her students. Patents often will not be an issue, because the firm can protect the value of the new product through its control of supporting products and systems [lo] . Because the information and patent protection issues are relatively unimportant in such cases, an academic patent and license office usually will not increase the incidence of such transfers, although it may garner part of the rent stream. And at the other end of the manufacturer spectrum, an entrepreneurial researcher who is determined to set up his or her own commercial shop will not be more likely to do so because a technology transfer office exists.
Nonetheless, significant opportunities to increase the incidence of technology transfer do lie within at least two broad categories. First, a patent and license operation may be able to link an established company with a new product that is out of its existing markets, and so may not be seen by the firm, but which ties in well with an existing capability.
An example would be introducing a biotechnology idea to a brewing company, because the brewing process is similar to the process required to produce biochemicals.
Second, a patent and license office may be able to help a startup venture get established, through financial, organizational, or informational assistance. Thus, there are opportunities for technology transfer offices to increase the incidence of technology transfer as well as the incidence of licensing. But the opportunities usually lie outside the realm of bringing incrementally improved existing products to established manufacturers. The opportunities lie in finding major new goods, or bringing new uses for existing goods to new manufacturers.
Has the formation of on-site patent and license offices increased the incidence of diagnostic imaging instrument transfer?
The honest answer is fuzzy -probably, but not very much yet, and it needs more study. If one goal for an academic patent and license office is to raise money for the institution and the researchers within it, how well is that goal being achieved? If the measure is licensing income, most offices do not make very much. Although offices vary widely in how they calculate income and expenses, very few report annual income in excess of two million dollars. ' Given current research support demands, even at a small university, this is not much money. Although licensing revenues will rise as licensing offices become more experienced, the income will rarely support more than a small proportion of academic research. Most license agreements do little more than cover their costs; and the elusive big hit is satisfying when it arrives, but will rarely be a line item in a university budget.
4 A fear frequently expressed in Washington and in the popular press is that foreign firms may obtain knowledge from American universities and transfer it abroad. This certainly occurs. On the other hand, American firms also benefit from research undertaken in foreign universities, and it is not clear that the It is not clear, though, that licensing revenue is the appropriate measure of financial success. A more useful measure would include all income that would not have been received by the university if the licensing office did not exist. Besides licensing fees and royalties, such income may include sponsored projects that require clear patent title, and federal research grants that require commercial technology transfer follow-up. In addition, if a patent and license office satisfies faculty demands for maintenance of a commercial conduit for their research, a university may find it easier to attract and retain high-profile researchers. Those researchers may, in turn, attract public and corporate research support.
Measuring such income accurately is difficult. Including all sponsored project and public research support income would greatly overstate the impact of a licensing office. But omitting all nonlicensing income will understate the impact and perhaps reduce support for the licensing office. Therefore. the topic remains a fruitful area for further study.
How can licensing offices transfer technology e/fctively?
Occasionally, technology licensing requires only three simple steps: file for a patent on a commercializable product, negotiate a license with an available firm or firms, and then sit back to receive royalties. But such cases are rare. Instead, each of the three steps is usually highly uncertain.
The commercial of a newly disclosed product is usually unclear. Because prosecuting a patent is relatively expensive, a licensing office cannot file for patent protection on every item that is disclosed to it. Thus, it must make commercial judgements. In addition, it must decide whether to file only in the U.S. or to incur the additional expense of obtaining foreign patent protection. It must also find licenses. Sometimes, an appropriate licensee is obvious, perhaps because the researcher responsible for the patented product has already identified a manufacturer for it. More often, though, candidates for Iicensing are much harder to find. Licensing offices must publicize their holdings and licensing personnel must establish networks of trade contacts. And even after a licensee has been identified and agreement has been reached, some monitoring is often necessary to be sure that the terms of the agreement are met. Thus, carrying out the basic tasks of prosecuting patents and negotiating licenses requires experience and judgement.
In-house academic patent offices have been much more likely that external agents to file for patents on disclosed products. Partly because of pressure from local researchers, partly because of their greater familiarity with local opportunities, they have been more willing to take on the expense of building patent portfolios. By creating patent portfolios, they have begun to accomplish each of their two main jobs -obtaining revenue if a product is successful and increasing the chance of technology transfer by ensuring that patent protection is secure.
But building a patent portfolio does not alone generate effective technology transfer. Relatively little transfer takes place through arms length agreements. Referring back to Table 2 , we see that such agreements are a minority of diagnostic imaging device licenses. Because research designs are usually far from commercially ready, much additional work and money must be expended to bring them to market. And because the additional work often must draw on tacit knowledge held by the developer, ongoing contact between the research site and manufacturing personnel is usually necessary. Even the diagnostic imaging devices cases classified as arms length agreements often involved post-license contact between the researcher and the manufacturer. Thus, the patent and license office must be able to negotiate the terms of such research development contact.
If the licensee is a startup venture or a small firm, rather than an established manufacturer, the task of the licensing office becomes even more difficult. Rather than simply receive a share of the firm's revenue, in the form of royalty cheques, the licensing office must often help the venture become organized enough to generate income in the first place. Hence, licensing personnel, like commercial loans officers in a financial institution, sometimes must also be part-time managers of their clients.
The task of dealing with a small firm becomes particularly acute when the university has an equity position in it. Many universities are now experimenting with taking equity positions in startup ventures, hoping both to garner revenue from products that traditionally have left the uni-versity without a license (recall, from Table 4 , that startup ventures were much less likely that established firms to negotiate licenses) and to increase the incidence of technology transfer [12] . Although only one equity venture shows up in the diagnostic imaging device data in Table 2 (two other cases were still at the research prototype stage and were omitted from the study), there are several hundred such projects now under way.
The terms under which equity participation ventures are established vary widely. In some cases, the equity is held directly by the university; in others, the university has established a for-profit subsidiary to invest in the ventures. Usually, the university's equity position is received in lieu of royalties and/or license fees, but in some cases the university or a subsidiary established by it also has invested cash in the new venture. Sometimes academic licensing personnel take an active role in advising management, but often they step back, at least once the venture is underway. Often the university or its subsidiary take an active part in finding venture capital for the new firm. Because almost all such equity ventures have emerged within the past five years, it is too early to identify the most successful models. In general, however, taking an equity position in a new venture will entail all the difficulties of dealing with a small firm, plus potential financial, organizational, legal, and political issues related to the university's dual status as research institution and commercial shareholder.
To summarize this section, effective technology transfer can be broken into two parts. One part includes the basic tasks of an academic patent and license office. By obtaining appropriate patents on products with commercial potential, the office lays the ground work for garnering revenue from licenses and other revenue sources. It may also increase the incidence of technology transfer, by ensuring that patent protection exists, thus providing incentives for firms to invest in additional development.
But have set up such offices, hoping to tap into the revenue stream that flows from their research. At the same time, the institutions hope to increase the incidence of technology transfer, by providing conduits between their researchers and commercial manufacturers.
The explosion of new in-house operations is still too recent to be judged. So far, no operation has been wildly successful. But most appear to be at least paying their way.
Many of the on-campus patent and license operations are experimenting with new research development models, especially forms of equity participation.
At the same time, the licensing offices are learning how to coordinate their research development work with other on-campus and external agencies. Watching and influencing the development of these models of licensing and research development will be fascinating and important activities for many years to come.
